The version of the code system which was used when choosing this code. Note that a well-maintained code system does not need the version reported, because the meaning of codes is consistent across versions. However this cannot consistently be assured, and when the meaning is not guaranteed to be consistent, the version SHOULD be exchanged.

Where the terminology does not clearly define what string should be used to identify code system versions, the recommendation is to use the date (expressed in FHIR date format) on which that version was officially published as the version date.

Indicates that this coding was chosen by a user directly - e.g. off a pick list of available items (codes or displays).

This has been identified as a clinical safety criterium - that this exact system/code pair was chosen explicitly, rather than inferred by the system based on some rules or language processing.

Amongst a set of alternatives, a directly chosen code is the most appropriate starting point for new translations. There is some ambiguity about what exactly 'directly chosen' implies, and trading partner agreement may be needed to clarify the use of this element and its consequences more completely.

Indicator for type of action performed during the event that generated the audit.

This broadly indicates what kind of action was done on the AuditEvent.entity by the AuditEvent.agent.

Indicator for type of action performed during the event that generated the event.

The period during which the activity occurred.

The period can be a little arbitrary; where possible, the time should correspond to human assessment of the activity time.

The time when the event was recorded.

This ties an event to a specific date and time. Security audits typically require a consistent time base (e.g. UTC), to eliminate time-zone issues arising from geographical distribution.

In a distributed system, some sort of common time base (e.g. an NTP [RFC1305] server) is a good implementation tactic.

Indicates whether the event succeeded or failed.

In some cases a "success" may be partial, for example, an incomplete or interrupted transfer of a radiological study. For the purpose of establishing accountability, these distinctions are not relevant.

Indicates whether the event succeeded or failed.

A free text description of the outcome of the event.

The purposeOfUse (reason) that was used during the event being recorded.

Use AuditEvent.agent.purposeOfUse when you know that it is specific to the agent, otherwise use AuditEvent.purposeOfEvent. For example, during a machine-to-machine transfer it might not be obvious to the audit system who caused the event, but it does know why.

The reason the activity took place.

Specification of the participation type the user plays when performing the event.

The Participation type of the agent to the event.

The security role that the user was acting under, that come from local codes defined by the access control security system (e.g. RBAC, ABAC) used in the local context.

This value ties an audited event to a user's role(s). It is an optional value that might be used to group events for analysis by user functional role categories.

Should be roles relevant to the event. Should not be an exhaustive list of roles.

What security role enabled the agent to participate in the event.

Reference to who this agent is that was involved in the event.

This field ties an audit event to a specific resource or identifier.

Where a User ID is available it will go into who.identifier.

Alternative agent Identifier. For a human, this should be a user identifier text string from authentication system. This identifier would be one known to a common authentication system (e.g. single sign-on), if available.

In some situations, a human user may authenticate with one identity but, to access a specific application system, may use a synonymous identify. For example, some "single sign on" implementations will do this. The alternative identifier would then be the original identify used for authentication, and the User ID is the one known to and used by the application.

Human-meaningful name for the agent.

The User ID and Authorization User ID may be internal or otherwise obscure values. This field assists the auditor in identifying the actual user.

Indicator that the user is or is not the requestor, or initiator, for the event being audited.

This value is used to distinguish between requestor-users and recipient-users. For example, one person may initiate a report-output to be sent to another user.

There can only be one initiator. If the initiator is not clear, then do not choose any one agent as the initiator.

Where the event occurred.

The policy or plan that authorized the activity being recorded. Typically, a single activity may have multiple applicable policies, such as patient consent, guarantor funding, etc. The policy would also indicate the security token used.

This value is used retrospectively to determine the authorization policies.

For example: Where an OAuth token authorizes, the unique identifier from the OAuth token is placed into the policy element Where a policy engine (e.g. XACML) holds policy logic, the unique policy identifier is placed into the policy element.

Type of media involved. Used when the event is about exporting/importing onto media.

Usually, this is used instead of specifying a network address. This field is not used for Media Id (i.e. the serial number of a CD).

Used when the event is about exporting/importing onto media.

An identifier for the network access point of the user device for the audit event.

This datum identifies the user's network access point, which may be distinct from the server that performed the action. It is an optional value that may be used to group events recorded on separate servers for analysis of a specific network access point's data access across all servers.

This could be a device id, IP address or some other identifier associated with a device.

An identifier for the type of network access point that originated the audit event.

This datum identifies the type of network access point identifier of the user device for the audit event. It is an optional value that may be used to group events recorded on separate servers for analysis of access according to a network access point's type.

The type of network access point of this agent in the audit event.

The reason (purpose of use), specific to this agent, that was used during the event being recorded.

Use AuditEvent.agent.purposeOfUse when you know that is specific to the agent, otherwise use AuditEvent.purposeOfEvent. For example, during a machine-to-machine transfer it might not be obvious to the audit system who caused the event, but it does know why.

The reason the activity took place.

Specification of the participation type the user plays when performing the event.

The Participation type of the agent to the event.

The security role that the user was acting under, that come from local codes defined by the access control security system (e.g. RBAC, ABAC) used in the local context.

This value ties an audited event to a user's role(s). It is an optional value that might be used to group events for analysis by user functional role categories.

Should be roles relevant to the event. Should not be an exhaustive list of roles.

What security role enabled the agent to participate in the event.

A reference to a location at which the other resource is found. The reference may be a relative reference, in which case it is relative to the service base URL, or an absolute URL that resolves to the location where the resource is found. The reference may be version specific or not. If the reference is not to a FHIR RESTful server, then it should be assumed to be version specific. Internal fragment references (start with '#') refer to contained resources.

Using absolute URLs provides a stable scalable approach suitable for a cloud/web context, while using relative/logical references provides a flexible approach suitable for use when trading across closed eco-system boundaries. Absolute URLs do not need to point to a FHIR RESTful server, though this is the preferred approach. If the URL conforms to the structure "/[type]/[id]" then it should be assumed that the reference is to a FHIR RESTful server.

The expected type of the target of the reference. If both Reference.type and Reference.reference are populated and Reference.reference is a FHIR URL, both SHALL be consistent.

The type is the Canonical URL of Resource Definition that is the type this reference refers to. References are URLs that are relative to http://hl7.org/fhir/StructureDefinition/ e.g. "Patient" is a reference to http://hl7.org/fhir/StructureDefinition/Patient. Absolute URLs are only allowed for logical models (and can only be used in references in logical models, not resources).

This element is used to indicate the type of the target of the reference. This may be used which ever of the other elements are populated (or not). In some cases, the type of the target may be determined by inspection of the reference (e.g. a RESTful URL) or by resolving the target of the reference; if both the type and a reference is provided, the reference SHALL resolve to a resource of the same type as that specified.

Aa resource (or, for logical models, the URI of the logical model).

The purpose of this identifier.

Allows the appropriate identifier for a particular context of use to be selected from among a set of identifiers.

Applications can assume that an identifier is permanent unless it explicitly says that it is temporary.

Identifies the purpose for this identifier, if known .

A coded type for the identifier that can be used to determine which identifier to use for a specific purpose.

Allows users to make use of identifiers when the identifier system is not known.

This element deals only with general categories of identifiers. It SHOULD not be used for codes that correspond 1..1 with the Identifier.system. Some identifiers may fall into multiple categories due to common usage. Where the system is known, a type is unnecessary because the type is always part of the system definition. However systems often need to handle identifiers where the system is not known. There is not a 1:1 relationship between type and system, since many different systems have the same type.

A coded type for an identifier that can be used to determine which identifier to use for a specific purpose.

Time period during which identifier is/was valid for use.

Organization that issued/manages the identifier.

The Identifier.assigner may omit the .reference element and only contain a .display element reflecting the name or other textual information about the assigning organization.

Plain text narrative that identifies the resource in addition to the resource reference.

This is generally not the same as the Resource.text of the referenced resource. The purpose is to identify what's being referenced, not to fully describe it.

Alternative agent Identifier. For a human, this should be a user identifier text string from authentication system. This identifier would be one known to a common authentication system (e.g. single sign-on), if available.

In some situations, a human user may authenticate with one identity but, to access a specific application system, may use a synonymous identify. For example, some "single sign on" implementations will do this. The alternative identifier would then be the original identify used for authentication, and the User ID is the one known to and used by the application.

Human-meaningful name for the agent.

The User ID and Authorization User ID may be internal or otherwise obscure values. This field assists the auditor in identifying the actual user.

Where the event occurred.

The policy or plan that authorized the activity being recorded. Typically, a single activity may have multiple applicable policies, such as patient consent, guarantor funding, etc. The policy would also indicate the security token used.

This value is used retrospectively to determine the authorization policies.

For example: Where an OAuth token authorizes, the unique identifier from the OAuth token is placed into the policy element Where a policy engine (e.g. XACML) holds policy logic, the unique policy identifier is placed into the policy element.

Type of media involved. Used when the event is about exporting/importing onto media.

Usually, this is used instead of specifying a network address. This field is not used for Media Id (i.e. the serial number of a CD).

Used when the event is about exporting/importing onto media.

An identifier for the network access point of the user device for the audit event.

This datum identifies the user's network access point, which may be distinct from the server that performed the action. It is an optional value that may be used to group events recorded on separate servers for analysis of a specific network access point's data access across all servers.

This could be a device id, IP address or some other identifier associated with a device.

An identifier for the type of network access point that originated the audit event.

This datum identifies the type of network access point identifier of the user device for the audit event. It is an optional value that may be used to group events recorded on separate servers for analysis of access according to a network access point's type.

The type of network access point of this agent in the audit event.

The reason (purpose of use), specific to this agent, that was used during the event being recorded.

Use AuditEvent.agent.purposeOfUse when you know that is specific to the agent, otherwise use AuditEvent.purposeOfEvent. For example, during a machine-to-machine transfer it might not be obvious to the audit system who caused the event, but it does know why.

The reason the activity took place.

Specification of the participation type the user plays when performing the event.

The Participation type of the agent to the event.

The security role that the user was acting under, that come from local codes defined by the access control security system (e.g. RBAC, ABAC) used in the local context.

This value ties an audited event to a user's role(s). It is an optional value that might be used to group events for analysis by user functional role categories.

Should be roles relevant to the event. Should not be an exhaustive list of roles.

What security role enabled the agent to participate in the event.

A reference to a location at which the other resource is found. The reference may be a relative reference, in which case it is relative to the service base URL, or an absolute URL that resolves to the location where the resource is found. The reference may be version specific or not. If the reference is not to a FHIR RESTful server, then it should be assumed to be version specific. Internal fragment references (start with '#') refer to contained resources.

Using absolute URLs provides a stable scalable approach suitable for a cloud/web context, while using relative/logical references provides a flexible approach suitable for use when trading across closed eco-system boundaries. Absolute URLs do not need to point to a FHIR RESTful server, though this is the preferred approach. If the URL conforms to the structure "/[type]/[id]" then it should be assumed that the reference is to a FHIR RESTful server.

The expected type of the target of the reference. If both Reference.type and Reference.reference are populated and Reference.reference is a FHIR URL, both SHALL be consistent.

The type is the Canonical URL of Resource Definition that is the type this reference refers to. References are URLs that are relative to http://hl7.org/fhir/StructureDefinition/ e.g. "Patient" is a reference to http://hl7.org/fhir/StructureDefinition/Patient. Absolute URLs are only allowed for logical models (and can only be used in references in logical models, not resources).

This element is used to indicate the type of the target of the reference. This may be used which ever of the other elements are populated (or not). In some cases, the type of the target may be determined by inspection of the reference (e.g. a RESTful URL) or by resolving the target of the reference; if both the type and a reference is provided, the reference SHALL resolve to a resource of the same type as that specified.

Aa resource (or, for logical models, the URI of the logical model).

The purpose of this identifier.

Allows the appropriate identifier for a particular context of use to be selected from among a set of identifiers.

Applications can assume that an identifier is permanent unless it explicitly says that it is temporary.

Identifies the purpose for this identifier, if known .

A coded type for the identifier that can be used to determine which identifier to use for a specific purpose.

Allows users to make use of identifiers when the identifier system is not known.

This element deals only with general categories of identifiers. It SHOULD not be used for codes that correspond 1..1 with the Identifier.system. Some identifiers may fall into multiple categories due to common usage. Where the system is known, a type is unnecessary because the type is always part of the system definition. However systems often need to handle identifiers where the system is not known. There is not a 1:1 relationship between type and system, since many different systems have the same type.

A coded type for an identifier that can be used to determine which identifier to use for a specific purpose.

Time period during which identifier is/was valid for use.

Organization that issued/manages the identifier.

The Identifier.assigner may omit the .reference element and only contain a .display element reflecting the name or other textual information about the assigning organization.

Plain text narrative that identifies the resource in addition to the resource reference.

This is generally not the same as the Resource.text of the referenced resource. The purpose is to identify what's being referenced, not to fully describe it.

Alternative agent Identifier. For a human, this should be a user identifier text string from authentication system. This identifier would be one known to a common authentication system (e.g. single sign-on), if available.

In some situations, a human user may authenticate with one identity but, to access a specific application system, may use a synonymous identify. For example, some "single sign on" implementations will do this. The alternative identifier would then be the original identify used for authentication, and the User ID is the one known to and used by the application.

Human-meaningful name for the agent.

The User ID and Authorization User ID may be internal or otherwise obscure values. This field assists the auditor in identifying the actual user.

Indicator that the user is or is not the requestor, or initiator, for the event being audited.

This value is used to distinguish between requestor-users and recipient-users. For example, one person may initiate a report-output to be sent to another user.

There can only be one initiator. If the initiator is not clear, then do not choose any one agent as the initiator.

Where the event occurred.

The policy or plan that authorized the activity being recorded. Typically, a single activity may have multiple applicable policies, such as patient consent, guarantor funding, etc. The policy would also indicate the security token used.

This value is used retrospectively to determine the authorization policies.

For example: Where an OAuth token authorizes, the unique identifier from the OAuth token is placed into the policy element Where a policy engine (e.g. XACML) holds policy logic, the unique policy identifier is placed into the policy element.

Type of media involved. Used when the event is about exporting/importing onto media.

Usually, this is used instead of specifying a network address. This field is not used for Media Id (i.e. the serial number of a CD).

Used when the event is about exporting/importing onto media.

An identifier for the network access point of the user device for the audit event.

This datum identifies the user's network access point, which may be distinct from the server that performed the action. It is an optional value that may be used to group events recorded on separate servers for analysis of a specific network access point's data access across all servers.

This could be a device id, IP address or some other identifier associated with a device.

An identifier for the type of network access point that originated the audit event.

This datum identifies the type of network access point identifier of the user device for the audit event. It is an optional value that may be used to group events recorded on separate servers for analysis of access according to a network access point's type.

The type of network access point of this agent in the audit event.

The reason (purpose of use), specific to this agent, that was used during the event being recorded.

Use AuditEvent.agent.purposeOfUse when you know that is specific to the agent, otherwise use AuditEvent.purposeOfEvent. For example, during a machine-to-machine transfer it might not be obvious to the audit system who caused the event, but it does know why.

The reason the activity took place.

Specification of the participation type the user plays when performing the event.

The Participation type of the agent to the event.

The version of the code system which was used when choosing this code. Note that a well-maintained code system does not need the version reported, because the meaning of codes is consistent across versions. However this cannot consistently be assured, and when the meaning is not guaranteed to be consistent, the version SHOULD be exchanged.

Where the terminology does not clearly define what string should be used to identify code system versions, the recommendation is to use the date (expressed in FHIR date format) on which that version was officially published as the version date.

Indicates that this coding was chosen by a user directly - e.g. off a pick list of available items (codes or displays).

This has been identified as a clinical safety criterium - that this exact system/code pair was chosen explicitly, rather than inferred by the system based on some rules or language processing.

Amongst a set of alternatives, a directly chosen code is the most appropriate starting point for new translations. There is some ambiguity about what exactly 'directly chosen' implies, and trading partner agreement may be needed to clarify the use of this element and its consequences more completely.

A human language representation of the concept as seen/selected/uttered by the user who entered the data and/or which represents the intended meaning of the user.

The codes from the terminologies do not always capture the correct meaning with all the nuances of the human using them, or sometimes there is no appropriate code at all. In these cases, the text is used to capture the full meaning of the source.

Very often the text is the same as a displayName of one of the codings.